The Guardian view on defending Europe in a new era: collaboration is the key | Editorial

It has become a truism to assert that Europe needs to fast-track its own strategic independence in a volatile world. A recent paper from the European Council on Foreign Relations describes the continent’s leaders as grappling with “a ‘Schrödinger’s NATO’ moment, in which America remains formally inside the alliance while behaving as though it were not, just as the Russian threat looms larger”. Donald Trump’s United States has become at best an unreliable and at times reluctant ally, as Vladimir Putin’s revanchist ambitions have exposed the need to strengthen Europe’s defences.

But if the goal of greater autonomy is to be achieved, far better coordination of resources and cooperation between national defence industries will be required. Neither has been much in evidence this month, with France and Germany abandoning a joint £100bn project to build a new fighter jet as part of an updated Future Combat Air System. Originally launched by Emmanuel Macron and Angela Merkel in 2017, plans for the jet were pulled as a result of irresolvable disagreements between Dassault, the French aviation company involved, and Airbus, the European aerospace company whose defence unit is based in Germany.

The collaboration, which would have been one of the biggest in the EU’s history, foundered due to disputes over technology transfer and over Dassault’s determination to play the lead role. As Spain, which also had a stake in the project, pointed out, this really wasn’t a good look. “The interests of industry have been placed over the interests of Europe’s security and defence, and I find that deeply worrying,” said Margarita Robles, the Spanish defence minister.

France’s heavyweight status when it comes to defence has been a source of national pride in the postwar period. But it does not have the resources to modernise single-handedly in an era of great power rivalry, as new technologies are transforming the future of warfare and deterrence strategies. Nor do other EU countries, including Germany – nor the Brexited UK. The risk is of continued technological reliance on the US, as with the current generation of F35 fighters, whose use effectively depends on Washington’s goodwill. Reported US pressure on Italy over the development of the “Michelangelo Dome” – a proposed AI air defence system – indicates that Washington will not give up its influence and competitive advantage without a fight.

An embryonic structure of coordination has begun to emerge in Brussels. In 2024 the EU published the first European Defence Industrial Strategy, and the Security Action for Europe mechanism provides 150bn euros in low-interest loans for defence investment. Much more now needs to be done to build on that platform.

Greater access to pan-European funding models can alleviate pressure on straining national budgets. Future subsidies and grants could be tied to projects which explicitly prioritise joint development and industrial collaboration. Not everything needs to go through Brussels. The multilateral defence mechanism launched by Britain alongside Finland and the Netherlands is an example of a complementary financing track that can augment Europe’s ability to meet the moment. As G7 leaders meet in Evian this week, another European charm offensive is being mounted to convince Mr Trump to exert more pressure on Putin over Ukraine. It’s necessary work, but so is the strategic transformation that would leave the EU less reliant on the diplomatic arts of flattery and persuasion.

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